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When individuals rank alternatives, they reveal preferences over
characteristics of these alternatives. The revealed preferences will almost
surely exhibit stochastic, but not absolute, consistency of choice. The
random utility model provides an important framework for study of stochastic
aspects of preference, and this essay adapts the random utility model to
examine rankings or orderings of alternatives. Results of the analysis first
outline relations of random orderings to the more extensively studied phenoim-
enon of random selection of individual alternatives and secondly provide simple
expressions in closed form for the probability that alternatives will be ranked
in a given sequence. The latter results provide the basis for empirical study
of random orderings through niaxTTnirm likelihood techniques.

This note outlines a technical problem and its solution. The
problem arises when an agency, or individual, announces for (n)
distinct projects an exhaustive ranking as to project importance or
priority in execution. This ranking will be a bijection which maps
each project into the set of the first (n) integers, or something
like:
rank: 1 11 : project number
2 4
3 15
• • • • • •
n 7
with order of importance decreasing as rank increases. Presumably,
this ranking is based on the attributes of the various projects, e.g.
the extent to which each project furthers stated agency goals, project
cost, nature of political opposition generated, past agency
experience, and so on. A basic question is how the announced ranking
relates to these project attributes and to what extent (if at all)
each individual attribute contributes to a high or low ranking for
specific projects.
Before the technical details of this question are addressed, it
seems best to highlight certain aspects of the problem:
(1) In general, not all project attributes will be observable or even
quantifiable, and it will not be possible to completely explain the
ranking in terms of only those attributes which can be observed.
—
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The unobserved attributes should be scattered over the listed projects
in a fashion which is essentially random. From the vantage of the
outside observer then, the announced rank for each project is a random
function of observed attributes. The goal of analysis is thus to
estimate the importance of various attributes and to predict future
rankings, using observable attributes.
(2) The integers representing project ranks are of course ordinal and
not cardinal data. In other words, the ranks only imply that one
project is more important than another, and do not at all denote
magnitudes of differences in importance. Any monotone increasing
transformation of the ranking will yield an ordering with different
(possibly non-integer) values for the range, but which preserves the
sequence of projects and hence is as valid a representation of
priority as the original integer ranking. The restriction of the
range of rankings to the first (n) positive integers represents merely
a useful and common normalization. It is clearly inappropriate to
regard this simple convention as conveying specific information as to
absolute size of project importance. The upshot of these arguments is
that any estimation technique which relies on the cardinality of
dependent variables is inadequate for analysis of the problem as
posed.
(3) The announcement of the ranking will in general not be acompanied
by specific details of the determination of project ranks. Obviously,
these details would be useful for analysis, but in their absence,
modeling of the choice of ranking will be required. Models usd to
explain, such. choice should definitely be characterized by two
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aspects: a) they should be based on a satisfactory theory of
decision which leads to consistent and rational choie, and b) they
should explicitly recognize that the basis for empirical analysis is
the observed ranking or ordering taken as a whole, and not (as is more
coitmon) recorded selection of individual projects.
I. The Random Utility Model
The arguments above characterize a ranking as a sequence or
listing of projects in terras of importance to the agency, where
"inportance" is a random function of observable attributes. More
explicitly, the importance of a project may be expressed in terms of a
"usefulness index" or:
(1) U - V(z ) + e(z ) for all (j ) in A
J J J
where: z = vector of observable attributes for project (j
)
j




A " set of (n) distinct projects
If agency choices are made on the basis of these usefulness indices,
then the agencies behavior may be said to obey the random utility
model. To simplify the model for empirical work, two restrictions
will be imposed on (1). First, the general function V(z ) will be
j
approximated by a linear combination of scalar functions of observable
attributes (such as logarithms, inverses, and polynomials of
attributes in manner common to econometrics). Secondly, and more
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significantly, the random terms in (1) will be regarded as not
dependent on values of the observable attributes (as would occur if
this error term varied with the "similarity" among projects) and
further that the random terms are identically distributed and
independent of each other. This more restrictive version of the
random utility model (denoted the independently, identically
distributed random utility or IIDRU model) may be written~"as:
t
(2) U(z ,e ) = u(z ) - b X + e for all (j ) in A
J J J J J
where: x » vector of scalar functions of observable
i
attributes for project (j
)
b = vector of policy weights for components of x
i
The error term will not be explicitly Included as an argument in the
utility index for subsequent convenience.
Under the random utility model (in both general and restrictive
forms) an agency will choose one project for execution out of set A,
denoted S(j ;A) , if:
(3) U(z ) > U(z ) for all k=j in BCA
Further, the agency will choose a particular eidiaustlve ranking for
set A if:
(4) U(y ) > U(y ) > ... > U(y )
1 2 n
th




the ranking or (r r r ... r ) = (r), and where (y = z ). As an
1 2 3 n r k
k
example, if project number 15 was ranked third out of all projects,
its attributes would be denoted either as vector z or as vector y .
15 3
Further, as x denotes a vector of functions of attributes for z , so
k k
also w will denote an equivalent vector of functions of attributes
k
3for y . In other words, (w » x ).
'k r k
k
As argued earlier, the e tenns may be treated as random
J
variables so that the U terms are random as well. Thus the above
i
inequalities will not hold with unitary probability. Using the IIDRU
model, the probability that inequality (3) holds becomes:
(5) Pr S(j;B) - Pr(U(z ) > U(z ) for all k in B)
J k
t t
» Pr(b x +e >bx +e for all k in B)
j j k k
oo t t
/ f (v - b X ) n F (v - b X )dv
^ j keB k
where Pr(e < v)»F(v) and f (v) is the associated density function-
Also, under the IIDRU model, the probability of the ordering in (4)
becomes:




Prfbw +e >bw +e >... >bw +e)112 2 n n
00 t n t n-1
/ f(v -bw)IlF(v -bw) Hdv
00 1 1 k=2 k-1 k i=0 n-i
Several observations should be made at this point:
a) The probabilities in (5) are generally called choice probabilities
as they involve choice of individual projects from project sets.
However, arguments in (6) are also choice probabilities as they
involve choice of one particular ranking from the (n!) possible
rankings of (n) projects. To distinquish these different sorts of
choices, arguments in (5) will be called selection probabilities and
arguments in (6) will be denoted ranking probabilities.
b) The assumption of independence for the error temrs in equation (1)
is really quite strong. In particular, when projects are similar in
terms of attributes, there are well known imp lausibili ties associated
with choices under equation (5) (Domemchich and McFadden, Manski).
Thus analysis of either selection or ranking probabilities using the
IIDRU model should be performed for projects that are conceptually at
least quite distinct.
c) Enpiricial applications of the IIDRU model require specification of
distributions for the error terms in (2), (5), and (6). The remaining
sections of this note will examine the nature and interelationships of
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selection and ranking probabilities derived in this fashion. While
many of the results considered here have been presented elsewhere, a
distinctive feature of this effort is the presentation of selection
and ranking probabilities within the unifying framework of IIDRU
models. In the next section, the most useful error distribution for
these models, the extreme value or Weibull, will be considered.
III. The Extreme Value Distribution
A particularly useful error distribution for specification of
selection and ranking probabilities is that of the extreme value or
Weibull:
(7) Pr(e < v) » exp ( -exp( -av - c))
where (a>0) and (c) are scalar constants. This distribution derives
its name as it is a limiting or asymptotic distribution of the
maximimum of a sample of (n) independently. Identically distributed
random variables, as (n) goes to infinity. In other words, just as
the Central Limit Theorem assurs us that the asytrptotic distribution
of the average of a sample of (n) independently, identically
distributed random variables approaches the normal, so another theorem
provides that the maximum of this sample may be distributed as in (7).
The only qualifications to this latter result are that a) as with the
Central Limit Theorem, not every arbitrary parent distribution has a
Uniting distribution, and b) there are actually three possible
limiting distributions for the maximum of a sample (the exponential,
the reverse exponential, and the extreme value) though only the
extreme value distribution has positive density throughout its domain
- 8 -
(David).
Routine computaticm indicates that if the error terms in (2) are
all distributed as in (7), then the formula for selection
probabilities in (5) reduces to:
(8) Pr S(j;B) = Pr(U(z ) > max(U(z ) for k in B)
t
exp (d X )
J
t
Z exp (d X )
fe'EB k
where the vector (d) is the product of the scalar (a) and the vector
of policy weights (b). In similar fashion, evaluation of the formula
for ranking probabilities in (6) using the extreme value distribution
for the error terms in (2) and (6) yields:
(9) Pr(r) =» Pr(U(y ) > U(y ) > ... > U(y ))12 n
n t
n exp(d w )
k=l k
n n t
n ( 2 exp(d w ))
lc=l j=k j
Equations (8) and (9) actually have simple interpretations. As
regards (8), consider an urn where balls of (n) different colors are
placed therein. If there are w(j) balls for the j color, then the
th
probability of drawing any particular color (k) out of urn B is:
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wOc)
(10) Pr S(k;B) =
2 w(j)
jea
When selection is a (possibly nonpositive) function of more than one
attribute, equation (10) generalizes into:
exp(v(2 ))
k
(11) Pr S(k;B) -
Z exp (v (z )
)
i£B i
where the V(z ) terms are as in equation (1). Selection probabilities
k
defined by equation (11) are said to obey the strict utility model.
As for the ranking probabilities in (9), they may be
strai^tf orwardly expressed in terras of the selelction probabilities
in (8) as:
(12) Pr(r) =" Pr S(r ;r ,r ,...r ) * Pr S(r ;r ,r ,...r )112 n 2 2 3 n
* Pr S(r ;r ,r ,...r ) * ... * Pr S(r ;r ,r )
3 3 4 n n-1 n-1 n
In other words, the probability of choosing the given ranking is
equivalent to the probability that projects were recursively selected
without replacement from the project set as a whole. It must be
recognized that both the "urn" analogy and the "recursive selection"
analogy represent properties effectively unique to choice
probabilities based on the extreme value distribution. If other
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distributions are used for evaluation of (5) or (6), then neither (11)
nor (12) respectively will hold. In fact, the following logical
relationships have been demonstrated elsewhere:
(1) and (7) if and only if (11) flfcFadden, Yellott)
(11) if and only if (12) (Block and Marschak)
with independent error terms differing only in mean.
By obvious inference, when the independent random uitlity model holds,
the useful and intuitive decomposition in (12) of the ranking
probabilities into the product of recursive choice probabilities is
valid if^ and only if the IID error terms for the random uitlitles in
(2) have the extreme value distribution.
In addition to being mathematically tractable, selection
probabilities based on the IIDRU model with the extreme value
distribution have several desirable properties. The two most
important of these properties are stochastic independence of
irrelevant alternatives (SUA) and invariance under uniform expansion
of alternatives (lUEA). The former property is defined as invariance
of the selection odds for two projects when changes are made in the
total project set (with both projects in question remaining in the
set). The selection probabilities in equation (11) clearly possess
this property as:
t
exp (d X )
Pr S(j;A) Pr S(j;B) j
Pr S(k;A) Pr S(k;B) t
exp (d X )
k
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An inrportant result here is that the SUA property is not only
necessary for selection probabilities to be as in equation (11), but
is also sufficient or:
(13) if and only if (11) (Marschak, McFadden)
Given the independence of error terms in (2), SUA would seem
desirable as a description of rational choice. For if projects are
indeed completely distinct, there is little reason for the odds of
selection to be affected by variations of project sets. Under more
general circumstances, however, such as pmounced similarity of
several projects, this property is quite suspect.
An even more interesting characteristic of selection
probabilities in (11) has recently been demonstrated by Yellott.
Suppose the given project set could be doubled in size by adding one
each of exactly the projects currently in the project set. The new
2
project set (denoted A ) would consist of (2n) projects for which
every project would have one (and only one) identical twin. This sort
of uniform expansion can of course be carried on (k) separate times
k
yielding larger project sets denoted (A ). The property of invarlance
under uniform expansion of alternatives (lUEA) requires that:
k
(1^) Pr S(j;A) « Pr S(j J(k);A ) for all k
th
where J(k) is the set of (k) projects identical to (j ) in the k
uniform expansion of A. As an example of this property, consider a
passenger on an airplane confronted with a cup of coffee, a cup of
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tea, and a cup of milk. New consider the same passenger confronted
with (k) identical cups of coffee, Ot) identical cups of tea, and (k)
identical cups of milk. What the lUEA property in (14) requires is
the intuitively reasonable result that the probability of the
passenger choosing a cup of coffee from the first three-object choice
set is equilivant to the probability of this sane passenger choosing a
cup of coffee (thou^ not a specific cup of coffee) from the expanded
choice set. Surely the lUEA property cauptures what most of us would
regard as an essential aspect of rational choice. What is so striking
about this property is that, in addition to being so appealing, it is
so restrictive for:
(1) and (7) if and only if (14) (Yellott)
*
with independent error terms differing only in mean.
In other words, of all IIDRU models, only those with error terms
having the extreme value distribution will conform to lUEA. In light
of this result, Duncan Luce has remarked that "in many contexts
Yellott 's condition is so compelling that his theorem means" that
IIDRU models and selection probabilities in (11) "stand or fall
together." (Luce).
In sum, use of the extreme value distribution for the error terms
of the IIDRU model yeilds selection and ranking probabilities which
possess both mathematical tractabitlity and which capture our
intuitions as to the nature of rational choice. As will be seen in
the following sections, these features make IIDRU models based on the
extreme value distribution almost unique.
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IV. A Second Error Distribution
In general, ranking probabilities are representable only by complex
matheiratical expressions. Using the extreice value distribution,
however, ranking probabilities decompose into products of selection
probabilities; in other words, there is a simple analogy for the
ranking terms. Of course, other simple analogies for ranking
probabilities exist, and correspond to different error distributions,
"for example, it is plausible to regard a ranking as having been
generated througji a process where the worst project was set aside and
given rank (n), then the next worst project was thrown out and given
rank (n-1), and so forth. This process of sequential rejection
without replacement may be expressed as follows. Denote rejection
probabilities as:
(15) Pr(U < mln(U ) for all k in A) - Pr R(j ;A)
Then the probability of a ranking generated by the above-described
process is:
(16) Pr(r) - Pr R(r ;r ,r ) * Pr R(r ;r ,r ,r )
2 12 3 12 3
*
. . . * Pr R(r ;r ,r , . . . r )
n-1 1 2 n-1
* Pr R(r ;r ,r , ...r )
n 1 2 n
This decomposition of ranking probabilities will hold if and only if
the error term in (1) is destributed as:
(17) Pr(e < v) - 1 - exp ( -exp (av + c))
where (a > 0) and (c) and scalar constants. This distribution may be
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termed the mmiinal extreme value distribution, as analogously to the
extreme value distribution in (7), equation (17) gives the asynptotic
distribution for the minimum of a sample from IID random variables
(subject to qualifications similar to those for the maximal extreme
value distribution) (David). Using (17), the expression for rejection
probabilities in (15) may be simplified to:
t
exp (-d X )
i
(18) Pr R(j;B) =
t
Z exp (-d X )
keB k
More importantly, using the minimal extreme value distribution in
(17), the equation for ranking probabilities in (6) can be written as:
n t
n exp(-d w )
(19) Pr(r)
n n-j t
n ( 2 exp(-d w ))
j=l 1=1 i
By inspection, equation (16) does in fact hold for ranking
probabilities based on the IIDRU model and (17).
This result sheds light on a problem earlier raised by Luce and
Suppes. These authors considered the comparability of ranking
decompositions in (12) and (16). Specifically, they argued that if a
common random utility model underlay selection, rejection, and ranking
probabilities such that the ranking probabilities in (12) and (16)
- 15 -
were equal, then necessarily:
t t
(20) b X = b X for all j and k in A
The theorem establishing this result is labled an "impossibility
theorem" as the result in (20) cannot hold generally; thus (12) and
(16) cannot in general be equal. Luce and Suppes worry that their
theorem provides "powerful evidence against" expressions (12), hence
(11), as reasonable descriptions of rational choice. These worries
are based on the implicit assumption (mentioned above and acknowledged
by Luce and Suppes) that a coinnon random utility model actually
underlies both selection and rejection probabilities, and also
equations (12) and (16). Of course, as has been established here, the
probabilltistic choice models leading to (12) and (16) are quite
different. Thus the theorem in question only establishes the fact
that ranking probabilities based on different random utility models
will in general be different, except in the rare case that (20) holds.
T/hile this result is Interesting, it is not a basis for criticism of
the choice models examined here.
The concerns of Luce and Suppes do however expose an area of more
substantive criticism. What their theorem (inadvertently) Involves is
a comparison of observable properties of IIDRU models based on (7) and
(17) respectively. But of course, it is possible to make additional
comparisons of this sort. For example, the property of SUA may be
ref orimlated for rejection probabilities as follows:
Pr R(j;A) Pr R(j ;B)
Pr R(k,A) Pr ROc;B)
- 16 -
In other words, that the odds of rejection for two projects are
invariant to changes In the total project set. Likewise, Yellott's
lUEA property cay be expressed In terms of rejections probabilities
as:
k
(22) Pr R(j;A) - Pr R(j J(k);A ) for all k .
where the terms in (22) are as defined in (14). Equation (22) simply
requires that the probability of rejecting one project identical to
(j ) does not depend on the nuirber of such identical projects present
in the uniforni expansions of project set A. For convenience, denote
SUA for selection probabilities (or (13)) as SIIA-S and denote lUEA
for selection probabilities (or (14)) as lUEA-S. These same
properties for rejection probabilities can be expressed as SIIA-R and
lUEA-R respectively for equations (21) and (22).
An important result here is that SIIA-R and lUEA-R hold
if and only if the TIDRU model has the error distribution in (17).
Further, both SIIA-R and lUEA-R are necessary and sufficient for
rejection probabilites to be written as in (16), given the IIDRU
3!odel. The obvious upshot of these results is that SIIA-S and SIIA-R
may simultaneously hold if and only if the rare condition in (20) is
valid; likewise lUEA-S and lUEA-R are compatible only if (20) holds.
These "impossiblity" results appear a bit more serious that those
discussed by Luce and Suppes, and suggest a need for tempering of
Luce's enthusiasum for Yellot's theorem. Ceraintly both SUA and lUEA
are nift^^ properties which appear to represent intuitive conceptions
of rational choice. But surely there is little reason to regard these
- 17 -
restrictions cm selection probabilities as any more of a hallmark of
rationality that exactly the same restrictions on rejection
probabilities. Since both sets of restrictions cannot similtaneously
hold for URDU models, it is not then clear how definitive SUA and
lUEA can be as a basis for prefering one error distribution over
'"-HI
another. Most explicitly, these properties do not seem to distinguish
Error distributions in (7) and (17) on the basis of consistency with
rationality. Maybe one set of restrictions is better than none, but
it is nonetheless disturbing that so few of out intuitive notions
concerning rational choice are fully coirpaible with each other. Under
these circumstances, derivation of "prefered" IIDRU models using such
restrictions is of uncertain usefulness.
V. The Normal Error Distribution




(24) Pr(e < v) = / dx
-« / 2iT
As argued elsewhere (Domemcich and McFadden), the selection
probabilities in (4) for the IIDRU model with normally distributes
error terns can be written as:
(25) Pr S(j;A) - F(0;m,P)
where: F = cumulative multivariate (n-1) term normal
function evaluated at the zero vector
ra » mean vector (n-1 x 1) for the normal distribution with
- 18 -
t t
Arguraents (b x - b x ) for all k in A,
J k
k not equal to j
P = covariance matrix (n-1 x n-1) for the
normal distribution with arguments
p = (2 if i=j and 1 if i/j)
The ranking probabilities in (5), using the normally distributed error
term become:
(26) Pr(r) = F(0;s,q)
where: F =« as above (again n-1 term)
s = mean vector (n-1 x 1) for the
normal distribution with arguments
j i+j t
s = S (-1) b w
j i-1 1
where j = 2, 3 , • . . n
= covariance matrix (n-1 x n-1) for the
normal distribution with arguments
i+J
s " (-1) min(i,j) where i,j * 2, 3, ... n
ij
The principle drawback to use of these choice probabilities is
their mathematical complexity. Further, there is little intuitive
rationale for either (25) or (26), and specifically (26) does not




To illustrate the above arguments, an example is offered.
Consider a project set with usefulness indices:
U - ln(5) + e
1 1
U - ln(4) + e
2 2
U => + e
3 3
For this project set, the accompanying Table gives ranking
probabilities associated with various distributions for (e).
Probabilities for the extreme value distributions are computed from
equations (9) and (19) respectively.
VII. Extensions
Thusfar, analysis in this note has been confined to probabilistic
selection or rejection of individual projects from a given project
set, or exhaustive rankings of this project set. Other regimes of
choice are of course technically possible, and it is useful to
consider two ot these forms. First, denote a partial ranking of ( j
)
out of (n) projects as (r;j,n). When the IIDRU model holds, the
probability of a given partial ranking may be expressed as:
(27) Pr(r;j,n) > Pr(U(y ) > ... > U(y )
1 J
> max(U(y ) ... U(y )))
j+1 n




n exp(d V )
(28) Pr(r;j,n) = ^"^ ^
J n t
n ( I exp(d w ))
which decomposes into:
(29) Pr(r;j,n) = Pr S(r ;r ,r ,...r )112 n
* Pr S(r ;r ,r ,...r )
2 2 3 n
* . .
. * Pr(r ; r ,r , . • .r )
j j j+1 n
A second useful regime for choice is the categorical ranking
where projects are segregated into (c) categories of predetermined
size. Under the IIDP.U model, the probability of a categorical ranking
with category sizes (j ,j ....j ) becomes:
1 2 c
(30) Pr(r;j ,j ,...j ) = Pr(U(y ), U(y ), ... U(y )12c 12 j
1
> U(y ), U(y ), ... U(y )
j+1 j +2 j +j
1 1 12
> ... > U(y ),U(y ),...TJ(y ))
n-j n-j +1 n
c c
Unfortunately, this probability does not decompose into a product of
selection or rejection probabilities when random utilities obey any of
the distributional laws in this note.
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1. Equation (2) introduces a dual notation V(z ) and (b x ) for the
i i
nonrandom component of the utility function. While awkward at times,
this notation appears necessary for the purposes of this essay. Most
of the theoretical results cited depend on the fully general form
V(z ) , while the applications for empirical work require the linear
J t
approximation (b x )
.
J
2. The project numbering provides one sequence of the project (z ),
J




3. Again a dual notation is maintained with V(y ) and (b w ) respec-
i J
tively denoting the general nonrandom component of utility, and
its linear approximation.
t
4. To interpret (5), define f (v) as f(v - b x ). Then for the case
j i
of three projects, the probability that project (j) will be superior
in random utility, hence chosen becomes:
Pr S(j;j,k,l) = ; f (v)F (v)F (v)dv
— j k 1
Thus for each value of the domain (v) , the product of the probability
that (U »v) with the probability that (U <v) and (U <v) is considered.
j k 1
The integral over all such values (v) gives the appropriate choice
probability.
5. The interpretation of (6) is also straightforward. Now define f (v)
t j
to be f(v - b w ). Then the probability of a ranking for, say, three
j
projects may be written:
TABLE
This table presents probabilities (as in (6)) for the six possible
exhaustive rankings of three projects with random utilities, where
nonrandom utility components are a given in the text and random












A: extreme value; equation (6)
B. reverse extreme value; equation (14)
Pr(r ,r ,r ) = / f (v ) / f (v ) / f (v ) dv dv dv123 —11--22—33 321
-
^1^2
- / / / f (v ) f (v ) f (v )dv dv dv
-« — — 11 22 33 321
Note that this probability is simply the integral of the independent
densities bounded by v >v >v . The general case is simply an exten-
12 3
sion of this example.
6. For a discussion of rejection probabilities outside the context of
IIDRU models, see the reference by Marly.
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Notes
We required the firms to be listed during the entire sample
period. The Center for Security Price Research (CRSP) monthly tape
was used to select NYSE listed firms. A firm was considered listed
if it had monthly stock returns available for the entire sample period.
2
The absolute percentage error is computed as the average of
Actual EPS - Predicted EPS
, „„„ . Since this error metric can be explosiveActual EPS '^
when the denominator approaches zero we truncated errors in excess of
ten to a value of ten. This operation was done for a very small percent-
age of the cases.




